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COUNTRY AND TOWN IN CHINESE REVOLUTION

*(Mao Tse-tung's Theory of "People's War" and
the Actual Events in China)*

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I The "theory of people's war" constitutes a pivotal point in the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung"—the basis of China's great-power, nationalistic policy. In Mao Tse-tung's view the armed struggle of the village against the town is absolutely necessary for achieving revolutionary victory and establishing people's power; the so-called people's war is regarded as a universal method so that the Chinese experience becomes universal and the Chinese way of revolution becomes the inevitable model for other countries and peoples.

A few years ago Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues discarded the major postulates laid down in the historic resolutions of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow Conferences of Communist and Workers' Parties and raised the schismatic banner of hegemony and war—the mainspring of the present-day policy of the Chinese People's Republic. The "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" deny the working class leadership in the revolution and isolate the national-liberation struggle from the international working-class movement. The "theory of people's war" is based on the idea that the events in Asia, Africa and Latin America—the "zone of revolutionary storms"—should be speeded up by means of armed struggle. To Mao's mind, in all the countries on the three continents that are still under colonialism, the revolution should begin in the

village and only in the village, because in terms of revolution the village is "good" and the town is "bad." The peasantry must rise against the towns, encircle and seize them. The revolutionary proletariat and progressive intelligentsia will be liberated by the "good village." Peking propaganda-makers claim that these ideas of Mao represent a new theoretical discovery and an "important supplement to Marxism-Leninism." But actually there is nothing in common between this "Sinocized Marxism" and the teachings of Marx and Lenin. Mao's "theory of people's war" fails to reveal the class essence of the problem.

Mao Tse-tung regards Asia, Africa and Latin America—the world of former colonies and dependent countries—as a "good world village" which sets itself against the "bad world town"—the advanced countries of Europe and North America. The "world village" must rise in a "people's war" against the "world town" so that revolution will triumph on a world scale. The socialist countries also go under the label of "world town". Hence the Maoists' conclusion: wars between the "world town" powers, such as the USSR and the United States, are not only useful but necessary in speeding up the victory of the "world village."

Thus, war should become a normal phenomenon in international affairs. That this idea is completely opposite to the Leninist policy of ensuring a stable peace and the security of nations in the present-day international situation is obvious, and there is no need to prove that it is against the interests of the masses throughout the world. Today there is a real possibility of preventing a new world war and securing a stable peace, owing

to the following factors: the might of the world socialist system and the international communist movement; the tremendous advance made by the national-liberation struggle; the intense political activity on the part of the working class and progressive forces in the capitalist countries.

Mao's foreign policies are based on the idea of war as the means capable of solving all social problems. Mao's statements to the effect that he is ready to sacrifice hundreds of millions of human lives for the sake of realizing his idea—the construction of a new civilisation on bones and ashes, with China playing the role of the world hegemon—are well-known. The whole theory of a "people's war" waged by the continents of the South against the North, and the East against the West, is nothing but a vision of a racial war to exterminate whole peoples.

The theory of a "people's war" waged by the revolutionary village against the counter-revolutionary town forms the thesis of the article "Long Live the Victory of the People's War" by Defence Minister Lin Piao, China's second VIP. The article was published on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the defeat of Japan in the Second World War. That Peking attaches great importance to this article is shown by the fact that it is mentioned in the Communiqué on the 11th Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (August 1966) along with the notorious "platform of 25 points" (June 1963) which sets forth the "special course" of the Chinese Communist Party in the international communist movement. It is also considered a "powerful ideological weapon" in the struggle "against imperialism and modern revisionism."

In his article Lin Piao treats China's war against Japanese imperialism as a vivid example of the "people's war," and particularly dwells on Mao Tse-tung's proposition that this "was actually a revolutionary peasant war." The very idea of the "people's war" is conceived from a narrow nationalist standpoint and posed in the context of so-called historical peculiarities of China. The peasantry alone is considered capable of waging such a war, but not the popular masses consisting of the working class, the peasantry, craftsmen, semi-proletarian elements and progressive intellectuals, led by the Communist Party. Thus the "people's war theory" is opposed to Lenin's teaching on the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to his characterisation of the national-liberation revolutions.

According to the Marxist-Leninist approach, the peasantry is undoubtedly a powerful motive force of a revolution in a backward semi-feudal country, which fights against feudal lords and landowners. However, its class position as petty property owners, its division into kulaks, middle and poor peasantry, and its isolation resulting from its being tied to a patch of land prevent it from becoming the leading revolutionary class. Lenin specially emphasized the importance of the working-class revolutionary ideology in contemporary national-liberation revolutions. Mao Tse-tung, on the other hand, considers the peasantry the only motive force of such revolutions. Herein lies the basic difference between "the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" and Marxism-Leninism. Although the working class is much less numerous than the peasantry, it is capable of leading the revolution because it is well-organised,

politically conscious and led by a Marxist Party. It is the class that can accomplish the historical mission—to lead the revolution to victory in alliance with the numerous peasantry.

In one of his last articles, "Better Fewer, but Better" (March 1923), Lenin stressed the importance of displaying the greatest caution in working with the peasantry so that the working class leadership and authority would be preserved. This Lenin considered a requisite for "a movement that must give rise to a world socialist revolution."¹ In his speech at the Third Congress of the Comintern (1921) Lenin explained that in the alliance of the working class and peasantry the leading role belonged to the proletariat that liberated the peasantry from bourgeois exploitation. In his "Preliminary Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question" Lenin clearly pointed out that even the poorest sections of the rural population would not resolutely take the side of the socialist revolution until the proletariat had won political power, until they "see *in practice* that they have an organized leader and champion strong and firm enough to assist and lead them and to show them the right path."²

Lenin attached great importance to the development of the Soviet Armed Forces under the leadership of the working class; he pointed out that the rural population should not have command over a large quantity of arms, as this would lead inevitably to the concentration of arms in the hands of the kulaks and the counter-revolutionary elements and thus to the actual rule of band-

¹ Lenin, *Coll. Works*, Vol. 33, p. 499.

² Lenin, *Coll. Works*, Vol. 31, p. 156.

its and kulaks instead of the dictatorship of the workers.

The Maoists' view on the role of the peasantry and on the significance of the peasant war in world socialist reconstruction is a logical consequence of Mao's petty-bourgeois, peasant ideology, which first became apparent as early as the '30s.

The Chinese Communist Party emerged in the course of the development of the working-class movement in China in the '20s, although in those years the working class was almost unnoticeable owing to the numerous peasantry. But though small in size, the working class headed by the Communist Party fought effectively for its interests. Chinese Communists were guided by the Marxist-Leninist principle that the revolutionary movement in a backward agrarian country should be led by the working class, united with and backed by the peasantry. The Chinese revolutionary movement reached a height by 1927, particularly in South China. The Communist Party had firm support in the industrial centres.

But the working-class movement of 1927 was suppressed and the revolutionary forces had to retreat from the big cities. This was to be explained by insufficient organization of the workers' armed revolt and a certain lack of unity among the workers; the savage suppression of the workers' uprisings in Shanghai and Kwangchow (Canton); the betrayal by the Kuomintang—the party of the national bourgeoisie; the atrocities committed by the Chiang Kai-shek counter-revolutionaries and the massacre of almost the entire revolutionary vanguard of the Chinese working class—450 thousand according to the Chinese

section of the International Class-War Prisoners' Aid.¹ Nevertheless, this was not a historical inevitability and did not mean that the Marxist-Leninist theory on the hegemony of the proletariat had lost its value and was replaced by that of the hegemony of the village toilers.

One of the main reasons for the proletariat's defeat in South and Central China was the isolation of the working class revolutionary movement in the big cities from the peasant movement, which had entered the democratic revolution late and was at first limited in its political objectives.

The fact that the Kuomintang counter-revolutionaries were busy fighting the workers and consolidating their own positions in the cities made it possible for a number of peasants' and soldiers' uprisings in the provinces to succeed. These uprisings were the basis on which the rural armed forces were formed, later to become the backbone of the Red Army of China. That was why the Red Army was first called the Workers' and Peasants' Army. The stage was set for the next peasant movement—the agrarian revolution, which was inspired by the armed working-class uprisings in towns but developed at a time when the revolution was undergoing a temporary low ebb. The workers had not been assisted by the peasants in time. But the heroic struggle of the working class cleared the path for a truly revolutionary uprising of the peasants and for their participation in the struggle for China's national liberation. In short, while the frightened rightist

¹ *La Rinascita*, organ of the Italian Communist Party, October 23, 1965, E. Sereni, "Lin Piao Strategy: Towns and Villages."

and blood-thirsty reactionary Kuomintang were consolidating their positions in the cities, the agrarian revolution was brewing in the villages.

No one will deny the role of the peasantry and the village revolutionary bases, or the role of military action in the Chinese revolution, and Mao Tse-tung is not the first to develop theories on this subject. Lenin spoke on the role of the peasantry in his report on the national and colonial question to the Second Congress of the Comintern, July 26, 1920. In its "General Theses on the Eastern Question" the Fourth Congress of the Comintern in 1922 stressed that the revolutionary movement in backward eastern countries could not succeed unless it was based on the support of the broad peasant masses. The theses adopted by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 on the revolutionary movement in the colonies and semi-colonies emphasized that the peasantry, together with the proletariat, with which it was allied, was also a motive force of the revolution. A number of resolutions and recommendations adopted by the Executive Committee of the Comintern concerned the situation in China; they noted the need for developing the agrarian revolution as a new stage in the national-liberation revolution. These Comintern documents were directly addressed to the congresses and plenums of the Chinese Communist Party and its Central Committee held in the '20s and '30s. They emphasized the tremendous significance of the peasant question and the peasant war for the new revolutionary upsurge in China.

This, however, in no way belittled the leading role of the working class in the Chinese revolution. It was then that Mao Tse-tung began to

interpret the historic directives of the Comintern from the positions of petty-bourgeois ideology, in a one-sided dogmatic manner, and to pass them for his own ideas. In doing so he took a negative stand on the working class role as the hegemon in the national-liberation revolution.

True, Mao Tse-tung did not always try to reject the leading role of the working class outright. In his article "On New Democracy" (January 1940) he wrote: "The revolution cannot win without the working class engaged in modern industry, because it is the leader of the Chinese revolution, because it is the most revolutionary class." But that did not stop him from saying in the same article that "...the Chinese revolution is actually a peasant revolution; the present struggle against the Japanese intruders is actually a peasant struggle. The political system of new democracy is actually the granting of power to the peasantry..."

"...The peasantry constitutes the main force of the Chinese revolution."

In his article "The Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" (1939) Mao Tse-tung openly denied the working-class leadership in the revolution and named the peasantry as the decisive strategic force of the revolution in China.

In a still earlier article "Questions of Strategy of the Revolutionary War in China" (December 1936) Mao Tse-tung reduced the entire revolutionary struggle to warfare, which he considered the only means of national and social liberation. Furthermore, Mao declared that the only condition for victory was the "absolute hegemony of the Chinese Communist Party" "enjoying the support of the peasantry." This long article, a

reflection of Mao's military experience (he headed the Communist Party Central Committee at the time), had no room for the working class and the towns of China.

Mao Tse-tung devoted all his efforts to making the village Red Army, the guerrilla detachments and the revolutionary bases in the rural areas (called the "red areas") the only vehicles of revolutionary struggle. Thus political struggle on a nationwide scale came to be replaced by military operations of the armed forces, and working-class hegemony came to be replaced by the hegemony of the Party consisting almost entirely of peasants and soldiers and supported by the peasant army.

But if one examines more closely the Chinese revolutionary wars, one finds that Mao's theory of the village "people's war" is not borne out by the experience of the Chinese revolution itself. Neither is Mao's idea about the vanguard role of the village in the Chinese national-liberation revolution more convincing.

Nowadays Chinese historians, supporters of Mao Tse-tung, write much about the peculiar nature of the Chinese revolution and point out its roots in the peasant wars and the anti-feudal uprisings of the ancient past—the Taiping Revolution and others. No one will dispute the connection between the peasant movements of the Chinese revolution and the anti-feudal wars. On the contrary, it is because of this connection that the peasant ideology of the past, which is far from being progressive, has found its reflection in the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung," including the theory of the "people's war." The history of the Chinese revolution shows that it was not the peasant movements,

but the organized revolutionary uprisings of the urban proletariat, that brought forth the Chinese revolution. The mass revolutionary demonstrations against the forces of imperialism and feudalism in the big cities, ports and transport centres had had a great impact on the revolutionary movement of the peasants. After the historic victory of the socialist revolution in Russia, the Chinese national-liberation movement became part of the world revolutionary movement.

Throughout its history China had been almost continually shaken by peasant wars. Those which took place at the beginning of this century were not only anti-feudal but also anti-imperialist.

The peasant movement, however, became part of the national-liberation revolution only in the recent past, when the proletarian Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Communist Party leadership had been established in China under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The Chinese revolution of 1924-27 and the powerful upsurge of the peasant movement in the south took place in historically new conditions resulting from the revolutionary struggle of the urban proletariat in Hong Kong and Kwangchow (Canton), the famous strikes of 1922 and 1925-26, the successful offensive launched by the Kwangchow people's revolutionary forces against the feudal warlords and the rebellious atmosphere attending the birth of the Canton commune.

The peasant movement of that period depended on the role of the proletariat which was the hegemon in the democratic revolution. The then proletarian centre Kwangchow—the horror of feudal lords, militarists and colonialists—did not need to be liberated by the revolutionary village.

On the contrary, it was the proletariat which inspired the true revolutionary spirit and will in the peasants and prompted them to organize for the struggle against landowners and militarists. Under the influence of the progressive urban forces, masses of peasantry became involved in the national-liberation revolution. It was for good reason that the administrative bodies set up in the villages during the upsurge of the peasant movement were known as workers' and peasants' revolutionary government bodies.

II The revolutionary events of the '20s in South China, which demonstrated the hegemony of the urban proletariat, played a crucial role in the subsequent development of the Chinese revolution. The Kwangtung Province and particularly its centre Kwangchow were then the scenes of people's revolutionary struggle carried out under the leadership of the young Communist Party. The revolution was making remarkable progress in South China through armed struggle. It was here that the dictatorship of the proletariat was established for the first time in China.

The national-liberation struggle in China represented a continuation of the cause of the 1917 Russian Revolution. The victory of the world's first socialist revolution "helped the progressive forces of the world and China to apply the proletarian world outlook in determining the country's destiny and reexamine China's own problems. To follow the path of the Russians—that was the conclusion". These words were said by Mao Tse-tung himself in the article "On the Democratic Dictatorship of the People" (1949).

The anti-imperialist "May 4 Movement",¹

¹ The "May 4 Movement" was started among Peking students in 1919. It was joined by workers, petty urban bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. It developed into

which originated in Peking in 1919 as a protest against the gangster terms of the Versailles Treaty, is regarded as constituting a crucial stage in the history of modern China. Mao Tse-tung has pointed out that the "May 4 Movement" ushered in a new period in the history of the Chinese revolution, which ceased to be a bourgeois-democratic revolution of the old type and became a democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat" ("On New Democracy").

In 1925 the "May 30 Movement" followed. It was a movement launched by the Chinese working class in the industrial centres, on the call of the Chinese Communist Party in connection with the shooting by Japanese troops during anti-imperialist demonstrations in Chingtao and Shanghai. The revolutionary storm swept the big cities of the country. Workers at foreign enterprises went on strike, and demands to end colonial dependence of China were voiced throughout the nation, along with protests against unequal agreements, foreign concessions and settlements, and the stationing of foreign troops in the country.

In the South where a ripe revolutionary situation existed, this political movement was particularly fierce and developed into a lengthy and bitter struggle.

The workers of Hong Kong and Kwangchow, together with the Kwangtung peasants, formed an active force in the struggle against the domination of militarists, landowners and imperialists during the revolutionary war of 1924-27. To some

an anti-imperialist movement and spread to 150 cities involving more than ten million people. A wave of strikes by workers swept China, and a boycott of Japanese goods was launched.

extent this resulted from the establishment of a united national front. The question of setting up a national front with the Kuomintang had been raised by the Communist Party. In this it had to overcome opposition not only from the Kuomintang but also among its own members.

The Chinese working class won its first victory in Hong Kong in 1922. The Hong Kong authorities dared not resist the unprecedented 200,000-strong demonstration. The authorities had to give in and make important concessions. The strike spread to many big cities and industrial regions. Strikes for solidarity with the Hong Kong seamen were organized in Kwangchow, Shanghai, Chingtao and other ports.

The young Communist Party of China also paid much attention to the question of the development of the peasant movement. The Second Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (1922) passed a declaration stressing that "300 million Chinese peasants were the biggest component of the revolutionary movement." Actually, however, the peasantry's support for the revolution was developing at a slow pace and fell short of the demands of the revolutionary movement.

The Party leadership of the peasant revolutionary movement was especially prominent in the province of Kwangtung at the beginning of the '20s. An outstanding role in the history of the revolutionary movement in the south was played by the Communist leader Pen Pai.¹

¹ Pen Pai was a teacher by profession and greatly influenced by the humanist ideas contained in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's utopian socialism. He was one of the highly educated intellectuals who stood in the centre of the Chinese proletarian revolutionary forces. Like Sun Yat-

In May 1921 Pen Pai left Kwangchow for Haifan, his birthplace, and began to work as a teacher. At the same time he carried out organisational and educational work among peasants in the village of Chihshanyueh. There he organized the first group of peasants of the new, revolutionary type, which consisted in the beginning of six poor villagers. Later it became the basis of China's first village revolutionary organisation—the Peasant Association of the Chihshanyueh village, proclaimed on September 9, 1922. That was the beginning of the peasant movement of the '20s, which later spread from the South to the rest of China and was closely associated with the formation of the Chinese Communist Party.² The name "Chihshanyueh" ("At the Red Mount") became a symbol of the peasant revolutionary movement, which was to become an important stage in the Chinese revolution.

A regional conference of peasant associations was convened in Haifan on January 1, 1923, which led to the formation of the Haifan Peasant Association. The Association comprised a quarter of the entire regional population—nearly 20 thousand peasant families. The traditional black flag of the old peasant wars in China was replaced by a black-and-red flag of the Peasant Associa-

sen Pen Pai understood the tremendous significance of the 1917 Revolution in Russia and saw in it a new way of transforming Chinese society. He was active in the "May 4 Movement" in Kwangchow. He joined the CPC in 1921 and took part in the 1927 uprising in Kwangchow. He was a member of the CPC Central Committee and the Politbureau. He was executed by the Kuomintang in Shanghai in 1929.

² *Lishi yangchu*, 1958, No. 9, p. 24.

tion, whose slogans were: "cut rents" and "abolish high taxes."¹

From Haifan the movement of peasant associations rapidly spread to neighbouring regions and soon to most of the Tungchiang region—the districts of Lufeng, Hueiyang, Hueilai, Puning, Wuhua and others. The associations in South China totalled over 134 thousand members² and in four years exceeded several hundred thousand.

The reason that the peasant movement of the '20s developed so rapidly was that it was based on the Marxist-Leninist policy of involving the peasant masses into the revolutionary struggle. The poorest peasants and farm-hands constituted the most active force in the movement, since it proclaimed equal land distribution as its objective, which was above all in their interests.

The peasant associations movement also had supporters from other social sections in the village—poor intellectuals, students and small merchants suffering from feudal exploitation. The Third Chinese Communist Party Congress convened in June 1923 in Kwangchow adopted a resolution on cooperation of communists with the Kuomintang while retaining their own political programme and organizational independence. Thus a united national front of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang was established.

Like the Comintern, the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) closely watched the revolutionary developments in China, particularly in the South. And it displayed readiness to render

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

² *Annals of History of the South China Revolution*, 1st Ed., Kwangchow, 1951, p. 6.

all possible assistance to the healthy forces in the Chinese national revolution. Since it had a tremendous revolutionary experience it helped the Chinese revolution above all by criticizing the mistakes of the Kuomintang arising from its isolation from the masses and its hopes of victory with the support of the imperialists and warlords. While criticizing the Kuomintang, the Russian Communist Party nonetheless supported it in every way in its struggle for democracy.

Both the Russian and Chinese Communist Parties expressed their desire to help the revolutionary democrat, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in setting up a revolutionary army and reorganizing the Kuomintang into a revolutionary political party. Dr. Sun Yat-sen had been bitterly disillusioned many times and gradually came to realize the need for an alliance with Soviet Russia and with the Communist Party of China. He warmly appreciated their help.

The Kuomintang began to carry out a number of democratic reforms. On January 20, 1924, the First All-China Congress of the Kuomintang opened and was attended by Communist Party leaders. The Congress adopted a new Kuomintang Manifesto—a programme of democratic revolution in China—and proclaimed the overthrow of imperialism as its goal. On the proposal of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, leader of the democratic Kuomintang, the Manifesto included several important political demands: the establishment of an alliance with the Soviet Union, the establishment of an alliance between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party and reliance on the mass movement of workers and peasants as the basis of the democratic movement. Subsequent events showed, however, that these measures failed to be carried

out in full. They were vehemently opposed by the right wing of the Kuomintang—the old opponents of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary democracy, who later promoted the counter-revolutionary clique of Chiang Kai-shek.

The Fourth Chinese Communist Party Congress (held in Shanghai, January 11-22, 1925) passed a resolution on stepping up the activities of the united national front and strengthening the ties between the working-class and the peasant movement.

The feudal elements quickly realized that the movement of the peasant associations was a threat to the feudal relationships that existed in the village. They began to suppress it by military force. The First Peasant Congress in May 1925 led by Communists proclaimed the policy of further developing the peasant associations. Its resolution emphasized the need for armed self-defence and the importance of the alliance of peasants with the working class.

An important event of that period was the workers' strike in Kwangchow and Hong Kong. The strike was called to express political solidarity with the proletariat of Shanghai, Peking and other industrial centres in their struggle against imperialist oppression. It was also an impressive demonstration of support for the national-revolutionary alliance of the democratic Kuomintang forces and the South China Communists. The strike was organized by devoted and experienced revolutionaries, Communists Teng Chung-hsia¹ and

¹ Teng Chung-hsia, a prominent Communist and trade union leader, participated in the "May 4 Movement" and organized the first Communist Party cells and workers' trade unions. He was elected Chairman of the All-China

Su Chang-cheng.¹ After Teng Chung-hsia had successfully organized the strike of textile workers at Japanese mills in May 1925, the Communist Party sent him to Hong Kong to organize the anti-imperialist workers' movement there. Hong Kong was then one of the biggest workers' centres of the whole of China—the workers numbered 250,000 in 1925.²

The Kwangchow-Hong Kong strike was one of the biggest and the longest political strikes in the history of the world working-class movement. It lasted 16 months and ended in victory for the workers. It was a great political and economic struggle by an organized working class under the leadership of the Communist Party. It showed that China could liberate itself from colonialism if it had a national-revolutionary government.

For the first time in history the working class of China demonstrated to the world its strength, high level of organization and courage in the struggle against imperialism. These revolutionary developments convincingly proved that the Chinese working class was the real hegemon in the democratic revolution. The strike strengthened the Kwangtung revolutionary base and created necessary preconditions for the Northward Revolutionary March whose purpose was to rally the Secretariat of Trade Unions and led the miners' strikes in Kailang in 1922 and the railway workers' strikes at the Peking-Hankou railway in 1923. He was executed on Chiang Kai-shek's orders in 1933.

¹ Su Chang-cheng was a seaman and leader of the 1922 Hong Kong strike. He was elected Chairman of the Revolutionary Government during the Kwangchow armed uprising of December 1927, and a member of the Comintern Executive. He died in 1929 at the age of 44.

² Hua Kang, *History of the National-Liberation Movement in China*, 1936, p. 259.

nation in the struggle against the northern warlords and the imperialists supporting them. The strikers joined the national-revolutionary forces of the South China revolutionary government set up during the upsurge of the working-class movement. With their help the revolutionary government defeated and disarmed the forces of the militarists in the east and south of Kwangtung Province within three months in the autumn of 1925.

The strikers became the reserve force of the South China revolutionary government in combatting the reactionary forces. The anti-imperialist strike created a situation in which all attempts by Chinese reactionaries and imperialists to put an end to the revolutionary developments were frustrated. The better educated and trained Communist workers formed propagandist groups and set out for the village to work in the peasant associations. They took part in the Northward March (second half of 1926 to the beginning of 1927) as political commissars. Subsequently they became commanders of the Chinese National-Liberation Army and prominent state and Communist Party leaders.

The strikers of Kwangchow formed a reliable political home front which made it possible to send the maximum number of genuinely revolutionary fighters on the Northward March. That was the most important outcome of the long strike.

In the course of the strike movement great numbers of workers in South China came to associate themselves with the young Communist Party, improved their ideological background and became experienced revolutionaries who later played a prominent part in the Chinese revolu-

tion. During the first ten months of the Northward March the national-revolutionary army defeated the forces of the northern militarists which were several times larger than itself. Half of the country including such important cities as Shanghai, Nanking and Wuhan was liberated. That was a serious blow at foreign imperialists and feudal reactionaries.

The Northward March continued to carry out the task of national liberation. It was able to win unparalleled victories because it was guided by the principles of military-revolutionary strategy and acted under combat plans worked out in cooperation with military advisers from the Soviet Union. The army's morale was high and military training was strict and uninterrupted. The army was under the command of staunch Communists. The victories scored by the revolutionary army greatly stimulated the development of the working-class and peasant movement in the provinces which the army had liberated from the northern militarists. Workers everywhere began to take up arms; the trade union movement became widespread. The Chinese revolution was approaching victory. The counter-revolutionary forces, however, were already operating, while Chiang Kai-shek prepared for his coup. Though the forces of the revolution were undoubtedly much superior to the forces of reaction in 1926-27, the former failed to achieve victory, the reason being that the rightwing opportunists headed by Chen Tu-hsiu, then in the leadership of the Communist Party Central Committee, followed a policy of capitulation to the bourgeoisie, which was determined to suppress the revolutionary forces. Like the Mao Tse-tung group today, they denied the vanguard

role of the working class in the revolution. That was a most outrageous historical crime of opportunism which affected the Chinese Communist Party leadership of that time.

In the South the counter-revolutionaries set out to wipe out the revolutionary gains immediately after the national-revolutionary forces had left for the North. Since in Kwangchow they would meet with the resistance of the Kwangchow-Hong Kong Strike Committee and the thousands of workers organized round it, the counter-revolutionaries made for the villages of Kwangtung. Despite the large-scale peasant movement there, landowners and right-wing Kuomintang forces had little difficulty in defeating the scattered peasant associations and eventually destroying them.

The documents on the suppression of the peasant associations in Kwangtung show numerous instances of mass massacres of Communists by counter-revolutionaries in all regions. The massacres were directed by landowners, but more often by their agents. The landowners would set the *tofeis* (local bandits) against the peasants, or used the *mintuans* (volunteer detachments of landowners) or local militarist units which were by then under the command of the counter-revolutionary and not the revolutionary government of the South.

The Provincial Committee of Peasant Associations was receiving numerous reports on the reactionaries' attacks and on appeals for help from villages. *The Peasant Question in China*, a pamphlet published in Kwangchow in 1927, described the political situation in the Kwangtung villages as follows: "...During the last two-three months the reactionary forces in different places have

grown considerably: the imperialists and reactionaries, constantly in league with the *tofeis* (bandits), have been carrying out reprisals against the peasant self-defence troops and the peasant associations. Bloody clashes occur in almost all the villages. Most often they are caused by terrorists raiding the peasant associations, as in Tanshui. Over a dozen villages have been destroyed in Huahsien as a result of fires, robberies and massacres committed by the bandits of the volunteer corps. Reactionary merchants from Tanshui together with the *tofeis* killed many members of the peasant association. In the districts of Yunan, Kuangning, Fenchuan, Tching, Leichang, Hueiyang, Kaoyao, Shunte, Chungshan, Haikang and others all the peasant associations have been terrorized and the people are once more under oppression. 'The peasant associations are *tofeis*,' 'dissolve the peasant associations', 'the peasant associations interfere with the affairs of the court' and similar counter-revolutionary allegations and slogans are being spread everywhere by enemies of the peasant movement."

The outcome of the peasant movement in South China in the late '20s was largely to be explained by certain mistakes on the part of the Communist Party leadership. The correct Communist guidance of the peasant associations in Kwangtung till May 1926 was mainly responsible for the rise of the peasant movement during the general revolutionary upsurge in the South. The movement in its turn constituted an active and important factor in the revolutionary development both in the South and throughout the land. It helped broaden and strengthen the democratic revolutionary base in South China and thus made

possible the organisation of the Northward March of the national-revolutionary army.

In May 1926, however, Chiang Kai-shek and other right-wing Kuomintang men seized the leading positions in Kwangchow. This was made possible by the fact that certain opportunists, headed by Chen Tu-hsiu, within the Chinese Communist Party caused the Party to depart from the principles of proletarian leadership, and to make concessions to the bourgeoisie. The surrender by the opportunists in the CPC of revolutionary leadership to the right-wing elements in the Kuomintang despite Comintern directives resulted in the curtailment of revolutionary development in the South, a weakening of the working-class position and the defeat of the peasant movement in Kwangtung, all of which enabled the counter-revolutionaries to mobilize their forces against the revolutionary city of Kwangchow.

By the end of 1927 only the Hailufeng workers' and peasants' government set up by Pen Pai continued to exist (in the Haifan and Lufeng districts with a population of about half a million). This liberated area had carried out land reform and formed its own armed forces.

In the heart of South China—Kwangchow—the starting point of the Northward March, a bloody counter-revolutionary putsch took place, following the Chiang Kai-shek coup in Shanghai on April 12, 1927. Kwangchow was swept by terror affecting mostly the working class. Thousands of the best Communists perished. Actually the terror started even before the April putsch, when Chiang Kai-shek's agents, having seized power in Kwangchow and ousted the revolutionaries from

all posts, resorted to intimidation, reprisals and secret killings.

The workers of Kwangchow, however, were not discouraged or confused by the counter-revolutionary onslaught following the coup of April 12. In December 1927 they rose and seized power in the city. The new government was called the Canton Commune.¹

The uprising was successful despite the overwhelming superiority of the reactionary forces. On the very first day of existence of the Canton Commune three divisions of counter-revolutionary forces were sent to smash it. Foreign imperialists provided warships to transport the counter-revolutionary troops and supplied them with everything they needed. Later the US, British and Japanese naval forces directly intervened. They terrorized the city and landed marine detachments to help the counter-revolutionary military operations. The Commune's workers' and peasants' guards and the armed population had but little military experience. There were only a few among them who knew how to handle weapons. For example, the Commune forces could employ

¹ The Kwangchow uprising was headed by Chang Kai-lei, Secretary of the Kwangtung Communist Party Committee, member of the Central Committee and candidate member of the Politbureau. Born in 1898 in the province of Chiangsu, Chang was active in the "May 4 Movement" of 1919. He was one of the organizers of the Chinese Young Communist League and the Secretary of the League's Central Committee. In 1922 he became Secretary of the Shanghai Communist Party Central Committee. He was a prominent leader in the 1924-27 revolution. He was killed in street fighting.

only four or five guns out of the twenty-five they had.¹

The Kwangchow uprising was nonetheless a great historical event. It showed that to win victory was not enough. It was necessary to safeguard the victory. The Canton Commune failed for a number of reasons, the chief reason being that the workers had to fight against large counter-revolutionary contingents unassisted. The armed peasants of Hailufeng were unable to support them in time.

But though the Canton Commune could not have survived under the circumstances, its significance for the Chinese revolution must not be belittled (the Maoists now refer to that stage of history in Kwangchow as putschism). The proletarian dictatorship in Kwangchow, based on the Paris Commune and the experience of state development in the USSR, shook the world by its heroic example.

After the defeat of the Canton Commune, the Hailufeng workers' and peasants' detachments of the Red Guard which were speeding to Canton had to turn back. The days of the Hailufeng Soviets were coming to an end. From Canton the militarists began to attack the armed revolutionary forces of the rural areas where agrarian reform had already been carried out.

On February 29 Haifan surrendered after a fierce battle. Having failed in three counter-attacks in Shangpei, the Red Guard Command decided to launch a guerrilla war. On a rainy night the main forces left for the Hutientung mountainous

¹ *Annals of History of the Revolution in South China*, 1st Ed., Kwangchow, 1951, p. 10.

region consisting of eight districts.¹ Women left together with the men, carrying food supplies and other provisions needed for the lengthy guerrilla warfare.

In 1930 the guerrilla regions in the Kwangtung Province were attacked by Chen Chi-tang, a blood-thirsty militarist, who cut off the area from the north and organized a punitive-and-blockade system of repression. "Mutual-aid regiments" of landowners were formed and the village *paotsia* police system (based on mutual-aid agreement between families) was strengthened. Determined to wipe out the peasant movement in the eastern part of Kwangtung, the counter-revolutionaries resettled the local population in cities and big villages. Adopting a "fortification policy," Chen Chi-tang ordered his men to burn down all houses in the mountainous regions and forbade anyone to go into the mountains. Military cordons were set up on all roads. Round-ups and secret blockades were carried out.

Within one month the punitive forces made forty raids on the guerrilla bases near Haifang, Lufeng, Hueiyang and Chichin. The whole region soon became deserted. For a long time after not a single house or a human being was to be seen in the 200-300 square li² area.³

The historic experience of the revolutionary developments in South China in the '20s and subsequent events in the country showed that the rise and decline of revolutionary movements were

closely related to the composition of the working-class and Communist Party leadership.

It should also be noted that the peasant movement in the South began to decline after the revolutionary workers of Kwangchow had been defeated (after the armed workers' detachments had set out on the Northward March and been betrayed by the right-wing members of the Kuomintang). The peasant movement also weakened after the Canton Commune was destroyed. Taking advantage of the insufficient contacts between the revolutionary town and the village, the counter-revolutionaries easily defeated them one by one. Amidst the stormy events of the revolution in South China, the Communists failed to give due consideration to the workers' and peasants' alliance and coordinate their actions. This was one of the most important causes of their defeat during the first stage of the revolution.

The massacre of revolutionaries by the reactionary forces turned Kwangchow, a revolutionary centre, into a centre of counter-revolution. Proletarian leaders—Communists who launched and directed the new type of revolution—were killed. Soon the villages of South China also became counter-revolutionary bases. The peasants became once more the victims of feudal and police oppression and the despotism of landowners and militarists.

After the defeat of the 1924-27 revolution the remaining forces commanded by the Chinese Communist Party were concentrated in several remote rural areas in Central-South China. There the revolutionary war of 1927-36 against the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek started. Those areas called the "red areas" became the revolu-

¹ *Annals of History of the Revolution in South China*, p. 23.

² One li is 0.5 kilometre.

³ *Annals of History of the Revolution in South China*, p. 28.

tionary bases of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the people's democratic government. In 1929 the revolutionary forces were scattered along the border area between the provinces of Chianghsi and Fukien, which formed the Central revolutionary base with Juichin as the capital. The territory had a population of about three million.

The Comintern Executive recommended that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party continue party work in the cities and, while developing the agrarian revolution, mobilize the urban and village population and work towards a new revolutionary upsurge. This advice, however, was unheeded. The left-wing opportunists in the Party, headed by Central Committee Secretary Li Li-san, drew up putschist plans calling for military marches from the rural bases to the cities of Changsha, Wuhan and Nanchang where large Kuomintang garrisons were stationed. Mao Tse-tung, who at first supported those adventurist schemes, later joined in the condemnation of "Lilisanism" in the hope of winning for himself leadership in the Chinese revolution. He used only the Comintern directives which concerned the rural masses but completely ignored those which concerned party work among the urban population. Together with the nationalist-minded members in the Party who had grouped around him, Mao launched a policy which amounted to severing the Chinese Communist Party from the Comintern and the liquidation of the leading party bodies in industrial centres and big cities.

During the period when the Party Central Committee headquarters were located in Shanghai, Mao Tse-tung tried to seize the key positions at

the revolutionary bases in the villages. In 1931 a "Central Workers' and Peasants' Government" headed by Mao Tse-tung was set up in Juichin. Simultaneously Mao Tse-tung began to worm his way into the command of the Red Army. His idea was to wage a guerrilla revolutionary war which would be led by the Communist Party and supported by the peasantry. This idea was conceived when the Red Army was repulsing the military "punitive" operations (1930-34) of the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek.

The Kuomintang terror of 1933 compelled the Party Central Committee to move from Shanghai to Juichin. Opposed to the Comintern policy regarding the Chinese revolution, Mao Tse-tung took a hostile attitude towards the new Central Committee leaders—Po Ku and Wang Ming. He started a factional campaign against them and later charged that their "leftist mistakes" had caused the Red Army's defeat at the end of 1933 during the fifth punitive march.

Under the threat of encirclement the Red Army base was moved in the autumn of 1934 from Central-South China to the northeast. During this strategic move (known as the Long March) in January 1935, Mao Tse-tung and a group of Central Committee members supporting him called an "Enlarged Conference of the Politbureau of the CPC CC" in the out-of-the-way town of Tsunyi. The conference removed opponents of the Mao group from the Central Committee and set up a new leadership under Mao Tse-tung's control.

October 1935 marks the beginning of the "Yenan period" in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. The Mao group set about build-

ing the Mao personality cult and spreading "Mao Tse-tung's thoughts". For several years no attempt was made to restore contacts with the communist underground in the industrial centres and big cities, which were lost during the Long March. Ten years later, in April 1945, the Seventh Party Congress included in the Rules the anti-Marxist proposition that "the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung are the guiding ideology of the Chinese Communist Party".

III Today Chinese historians carefully avoid discussing the reason why it was impossible either in the "Yenan period" or during the earlier civil war (1927-36) against the Chiang Kai-shek reaction, a war in which the Communist Party relied only on the village, to launch a march on the big cities and liberate them. For the Communist Party was not only defeated when it broke away from the urban proletariat but also lost a large number of its cadres. By 1937 only 40 thousand cadres out of a total of 300 thousand remained and the army had dwindled to 30 thousand men.¹ What is important here, however, is not the numerical loss only, but that Mao Tse-tung and his followers had imposed a peasant orientation on the Communist Party. By rejecting working-class hegemony and depending on the village and by assuming a hostile attitude towards the city, the Mao leadership had by 1937 all but destroyed the Party's proletarian nucleus and had alienated the petty urban bourgeoisie and particularly the intelligentsia. This, as subsequent events showed, greatly affected Communist Party prestige among the urban population and reduced

¹ Miao Chu-huang, *Short History of the Communist Party of China*, M. 1958, pp. 132, 170.

the effectiveness of the Communist-headed united national front during the war against Japan.

Mao Tse-tung and the advocates of his concept of "people's war" waged by the village against the town try to ignore the historical facts concerning the balance of forces between the village and the town in the Chinese revolution prior to the war against Japan in 1937-45. They believe that the Party came to adopt a correct policy only after the enlarged conference of the Central Committee Politbureau in Tsunyi in 1935.

In his article "Long Live the Victory of the People's War", Lin Piao attempts to generalize the Chinese experience of the "people's war" waged by the village against the town (where Japanese garrisons were stationed) and present it as a universal experience applicable to all countries and peoples. While extolling the peasant guerrilla actions directed by the Communists, the Mao "theoreticians" forget the simple fact that the war against the Japanese invaders is one thing and the revolutionary war of the "world village" against the "world town" another.

The "people's war" concept is nothing but an empty slogan, like the numerous commonplace sayings and prophecies of Mao clothed in the forms of aphorisms and precepts. Nowadays the Maoists cite any popular movement, any armed struggle in any country which is against "imperialism, revisionism and reaction" as proof of the vitality of Mao's pseudo-scientific concepts.

The Mao men keep talking about certain objective laws of the "people's war", laws which have been discovered by Mao and which represent "a great contribution to the cause of the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples and na-

tions." In his attempt to describe these "objective laws" Lin Piao invents a "new" version of the alignment of world forces. According to this version, the class principle is replaced by geographical, racial and nationalist considerations. The main contradiction today is not the struggle of the forces of socialism against capitalism, but that of the "world village" against the "world town". Thus the decisive factor in modern world development is not the socialist system, but the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America which stand in opposition to all the advanced nations of Europe and the United States. In plain words, Lin Piao conceives of a liberation march undertaken by one country or continent against another under the auspices of China and "the banner of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."

But it is clear that a war waged by the "poor of the three continents" against the "rich of the north" would in fact be a war of conquest, or a war of aggression, and not one of liberation, whatever social motives may lie behind it. Thus it is difficult for the Chinese "theorists" to come up with a credible, concrete idea that would justify their vulgar conception, and even more difficult to relate it to the Chinese people's just war against Japan.

The Sino-Japanese war was above all a war fought by the victims of aggression against the aggressor. Such wars have always been objectively just. It was fundamentally the same kind of war which the Soviet Union fought against foreign interventionists in 1918-20 and against German fascism in 1941-45. Other peoples have fought against aggressors during the last fifty years; not long ago the Korean people fought

against US aggression, and today the heroic people of Vietnam are waging a struggle against the US aggressors.

The Chinese people's war against Japan was a just war of national liberation and defence. The Chinese people defended their country against imperialist military expansion. Two tasks were accomplished in the course of the Sino-Japanese war. Firstly, Japanese imperialists were chased out from China, and secondly the democratic forces inside China were strengthened despite the opposition of the Kuomintang regime supported by US imperialists, who had their own designs on China.

After the Soviet armed forces had defeated the Kwantung army, the Communist-headed democratic forces of China began their revolutionary war against the Chiang Kai-shek armies. That was a new kind of war—the war of national liberation. Its objectives were purely national—the overthrow of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism in China.

On what basis, then, do the Maoists fit both of these wars into their universal concept of the "people's war"? For the difference between them is obvious. The balance of the internal and external belligerent forces, the factor determining the nature of any war, was entirely different in the two instances.

In the first instance the cause of the whole nation was what objectively united all the Chinese patriotic forces against the external enemy—Japanese imperialism. In the second instance, the war was between two different social sections, whose causes were not only different but diametrically opposed to one another. The chief enemy

of the democratic forces was the rotten, anti-popular Kuomintang regime, while the struggle against US imperialism was of secondary significance. The war against the Japanese invaders and the civil war against Chiang Kai-shek do not constitute a single process of the so-called people's war as Maoist theoreticians try to depict.

The "people's war" concept assumes the existence of a united people's front—an alliance of all sections of the population in the struggle against imperialism. The victory of the people's front means in this case the triumph of a "new democratic revolution." The next stage of its development lies in the struggle of the progressive forces not only against the imperialists but also against national feudal lords and the bureaucratic capital. The victory scored by these forces led by the Communist Party means a socialist revolution.

This scheme worked out by Mao, however, does not reflect the world liberation process or the Chinese revolution itself. For the Chinese Communist Party failed to carry out to the end the tactics of the united national front in the Sino-Japanese war. Furthermore, during the struggle against the Japanese army there often took place a simultaneous struggle against the Kuomintang generals and reactionaries.

The new war—the civil revolutionary war of 1946-49—was not a direct continuation of the war against imperialist Japan. At first the Chinese Communist Party made considerable efforts to reach a political settlement of the nation's problems by forming a coalition government with the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang as a first step towards the country's peaceful transition to socialism. This objective was included in the reso-

lutions of the Seventh Party Congress (April, 1945) at which Mao Tse-tung himself delivered a report "On a Coalition Government." After the victory over Japan the Communist Party again tried in April 1949 to reach an agreement with Kuomintang. As a matter of fact, ever since the setting up of the Chinese People's Republic, the Chinese Government has left the door half open for talks with Chiang Kai-shek. It was for this reason that No. 2 war criminal Li Tsung-jen, the militarist from Kuanghsi, was accorded a warm welcome in Peking some time ago.

It would be pointless to argue about the tremendous part played by the Chinese peasantry in the war against Japan, if the Maoists had not deliberately set out to confuse the national goals of this war with the revolutionary goals. The main task of the village in this war consisted in carrying out guerrilla warfare against the Japanese forces and communications in China, paralyzing and splitting the enemy troops and preventing them from further penetrating into the country. It is not surprising that the Chinese themselves call that war a war of resistance and not liberation. The Japanese forces were unable to occupy the multi-million-strong hostile village, where anti-Japanese bases and guerrilla centres were easily organized. But those bases were insufficient for waging an effective war of the village against the towns, where Japanese and puppet garrisons held firm positions. It is a fact that the guerrilla forces did not take a single big city during the entire war of 1937-45.

This, however, does not in the least lessen the significance of the peasant factor in the struggle against foreign invaders. Furthermore, in China

that struggle went beyond the national goal of defeating and ousting the foreign enemy. In areas liberated by the guerrilla forces the bureaucratic and feudal lackeys of Japanese imperialism and Kuomintang reaction were suppressed, chased away or fled on their own. Thus the prospect was opened for a revolutionary development of the village, for agrarian reform and for setting up local democratic governments. By the end of the anti-Japanese war the Chinese villages in formerly occupied areas had not only become stronger under Communist Party guidance but had also undergone a revolutionary change.

But the tremendous significance of the peasant factor was fully revealed only when imperialist Japan had capitulated under the blows of the Soviet Army. The village communist forces poured into the cities in the North and Northeast not yet occupied by Kuomintang divisions, which had the help of the US Air Force. It is a well-known fact that when the Soviet Army entered Chinese cities it promoted the cause of liberation and created the most favourable conditions for the Chinese National-Liberation Army.

On accepting the Kwantung army's capitulation in North-East China, the Soviet command handed the captured armaments and munitions over to the Chinese Communists. Those captured by two out of the three Soviet fronts in the East included over 3,700 guns, mortars and grenade dischargers, 600 tanks, 861 planes, about 1,200 machine-guns, nearly 680 various depots, as well as the Sungari river flotilla. The Chinese Communist forces were also given the opportunity of undergoing the necessary military training and enlarging the personnel. At that time the Chinese

Communist Party could easily have begun the formation of democratic government bodies in the northern and eastern provinces.

Such was the actual process of encirclement and liberation of the town by the village in North-East China, which became the main base for the major forces of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in the winter and spring of 1946 when a new stage in the development of the revolutionary war began.

That stage was the complicated frontal and mobile civil war in which the regular troops of the People's Liberation Army and not the guerrilla detachments of the liberated rural areas played the decisive role. The People's Liberation Army which had won firm positions in the North and North-East launched an offensive on the Chiang Kai-shek front in the South. The village naturally also played an important part in that offensive. It had by that time dealt a mortal blow at feudalism in the North and was now assisting the People's Liberation Army and resisting the Chiang Kai-shek forces which had appeared on the scene after the Japanese capitulation.

The relationship between the military, patriotic and class forces in the Sino-Japanese war and their distribution among the fortified cities and the huge rural area that formed a hostile encirclement round the Japanese-occupied cities led Mao Tse-tung and other leaders to suppose that the war was of a special type which they called "people's war."

It is noteworthy that in his articles "Questions Concerning the Strategy of the Guerrilla War Against Japanese Invaders", "On the Protracted

War" and others written during the first year of the Sino-Japanese war Mao Tse-tung emphasized that the revolutionary war in China, both as a civil war and a national war, was not typical and was fought under circumstances peculiar to China, being developed first in the villages and then in the towns.

Mao's overemphasis on the importance of the village and his opposing the village to the town resulted in an exaggeration of China's "special" and "own" path of revolution. This is also the basis of "Sinocized Marxism"—Marxism in a "national form."

Proceeding from Mao's old estimate of the exclusiveness of China's path, the Maoist scribblers are now trying to force onto that path the peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Lin Piao writes: "Mao Tse-tung's theory of the people's war is applicable not only in China. It is a great contribution to the cause of the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed nations and peoples." The Peking leadership tirelessly talks about the similarity between the paths and destinies of the Chinese people and those of all the peoples who are striving for revolutionary changes (*Jen-min jihpao*, February 20, 1966, and others). The Maoist historians and propagandists are trying to convince the colonial and semi-colonial peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America that the only way to wage a national-liberation and revolutionary war is through strategic dependence on the peasantry and through armed struggle.

Such an approach runs basically counter to the Marxist-Leninist conception of the leading role of the working class and the possibilities of a peaceful development of revolution; it is an ap-

proach designed to obscure the great influence on modern revolutionary processes exerted by the contemporary working-class and communist movement and the important role of the Soviet Union in international development.

IV The concluding stage of the 1946-49 revolutionary war—the liberation of South China—clearly shows the groundlessness of Mao's conception. The role played by the village in the North in this concluding phase of the war was different from that of the village in the South. In the North the liberation forces marched on the cities from their old anti-Japanese guerrilla bases in the rural areas. In the South, however, the cities were first liberated by the People's Liberation Army that had come from the North, and only then the rural areas began gradually to be freed of the Kuomintang and counter-revolutionary forces.

The resolution of the Second Central Committee Plenum of March 13, 1949 stressed that at the time the Party's principal task in the North was to mobilize all forces for restoring and developing production activities, and that the tasks of the Party and the People's Liberation Army in the South were to liquidate the Kuomintang reactionary forces, set up Party, state and public organisations and carry out preparatory work for the implementation of democratic reforms in towns and villages.

The Communist forces actually returned from the North to their old base in South China, and first of all, to the urban centre Kwangchow, which had played a crucial part in the first revolution-

ary war of 1924-27. Revolutionaries from the South who had survived the Kuomintang terror of the late '20s and '30s, came back together with the troops. It was again the town and not the village that had become the base of the people's forces in the liberation of South China.

The village, on the other hand, which meant almost the entire Province of Kwangtung and particularly the Kuanghsi Province with a population of about 50 million, actually became a base of resistance to the liberation of the South. It became the shelter for counter-revolutionaries and what remained of the Kuomintang divisions and the Chiang Kai-shek bands. The hostile press in Hong Kong predicted at the time that the Communist forces from the North would be strangled by the enemies surrounding them. And indeed the liberation of South China took considerable military effort.

In the course of a year troops of the People's Liberation Army twice combed the Kuanghsi Province and many districts in Kwangtung. When these rural areas were liberated, thousands of political workers from towns as well as the army were sent there to mobilize the peasants in carrying out land reform. The priority of the town in carrying out the Communist Party policy continued after that reform had been implemented. The scheme according to which the village surrounds and liberates the town, which is partially true for the North, is not at all true for the people's liberation struggle in the South. It is not universal for the Chinese revolution as a whole.

On October 1, 1949, the Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed in a solemn ceremony in Tiananmen Square in Peking. According to Mao

Tse-tung's followers, the Republic was founded as a result of the victory scored by the revolutionary Chinese village over the counter-revolutionary town. But meanwhile the peasantry in the other half of China—to the south of the Yangtze River—had not been engaged in any kind of "people's war." On the contrary, South China remained the scene of feudal and imperialist oppression and Kuomintang reaction. Democratic elements had been ruthlessly suppressed there ever since 1934, when according to Mao Tse-tung himself the southern revolutionary bases were completely lost.

On the eve of the liberation of the South only a few districts in eastern Kwangtung, where people's guerrilla detachments had been sheltering from the Kuomintang punitive troops, had come out in support of the People's Liberation Army, as well as several districts deep in the Hainan Island where the guerrilla detachments of General Feng Pao-chu had held firm despite the Kuomintang punitive expeditions against them. The revolutionary elements in the South were driven underground.

When Japan capitulated US imperialists and the Kuomintang leaders took advantage of the concentration of counter-revolutionary and reactionary forces in southern towns and villages to launch their new schemes, according to which South China was to become the bulwark of reaction and a military-political and economic base in the struggle against the people's liberation forces in North and Central China. Extremely active in these schemes was the notorious militarist Li Tsung-jen, Chiang Kai-shek's deputy and Vice President of the Kuomintang government. Later

he was denounced by the new government as war criminal No. 2, which, however, did not stop Mao Tse-tung and his group from according Li a warm welcome in Peking recently.

The situation in the local Party organizations, particularly those in the South on which the new people's rule had to lean, was extremely complex. Even in the biggest cities there were only several tens or hundreds of Communists. The provincial towns had only a few Communists, and the villages none at all. The newly-formed Party organizations remained illegal for the first two or three years because of counter-revolutionary terror.

As a rule, local Party workers were unexperienced and needed further training. Therefore the local Party and administrative bodies were headed by the Communists who had come with the People's Liberation Army or were specially sent from Peking, Wuhan and other cities in North and Central China. The People's Liberation Army became the main revolutionary force and support of the new system. The local peasantry was mostly an inert mass and remained a good medium for counter-revolution during the first years following liberation. The Communist Party had to exert tremendous efforts to mobilize the multi-million peasantry. The land reform represented a decisive stage in the peasantry's shift to the side of the Chinese People's Government. The Communist Party succeeded in establishing its leadership over the peasantry and forming an alliance of the working class and the peasantry. Such was the actual situation during and after the liberation of South China, which the Maoists today call the "triumph of the people's war theory."

It took a year and a half to crush the remnants

of the Kuomintang troops in different parts of South China. Later (in 1954) a systematic struggle was carried out in the towns and particularly in the villages against all kinds of counter-revolutionaries who resisted all measures of the new government. At first, when the People's Liberation Army entered South China, the Kuomintang practically offered no resistance—it could not. Its army surrendered, or whole army units joined the people's forces. But there were also many officers and men, mainly those guilty of crimes against the Communists and the people, who kept up armed resistance. They formed the counter-revolutionary bands that flooded the regions where the old feudal system still prevailed.

The counter-revolutionary and Kuomintang bands began to adapt themselves to the new situation by secretly forming underground forces and penetrating into the people's government bodies in the villages and peasant associations, state economic management agencies and even the army. They spread panic and sabotaged the first measures taken by the people's government, killed Communists and supporters of the Chinese People's Republic. Landowners and people around them supported the counter-revolution in the village. Most of Kuanghsi Province remained a shelter for numerous active Kuomintang elements which were part of the Kuanghsi clique that ruled the province during the Chiang Kai-shek regime and had its own military force.

The underground Kuomintang organisations and scouts staged mutinies and demonstrations rallying those dissatisfied with the new system. They became particularly active in the autumn

of 1950 when the Chinese volunteer army joined the struggle against the US aggressors in Korea.

Within just one year after the liberation of Kwangtung Province, the counter-revolutionaries carried out 488 armed raids and mutinies, killed or wounded nearly two thousand Communists. In Kuanghsi Province the number of active supporters of the people's government killed by counter-revolutionaries ran into 3,600.¹ Many big and small counter-revolutionary uprisings took place there in 1951.

In April 1951 "Rules of Struggle Against Counter-Revolutionaries" were adopted by the Central People's Government. A campaign to suppress counter-revolution was launched. It was particularly intense and at times even ruthless in the South. Between October 10, 1950 and August 10, 1951, 28,332 death sentences were passed on counter-revolutionaries in Kwangtung Province alone.²

In Kuanghsi Province the campaign against counter-revolution became a continuation of the struggle against armed banditry in the winter of 1950-51. The Kuanghsi counter-revolutionaries were rather active and well-organized, owing to the still powerful influence of the Kuanghsi clique on the politically inexperienced youth.

The Government began to carry out land reform in Kwangtung in November 1950, but in Kuanghsi only in the spring of 1951, after the suppression of mass armed banditry. This does

not of course mean that the peasantry in South China was less enthusiastic about the land reform than the peasantry in the North. They were equally anxious to get land. But they had not been prepared to take an active part in carrying out agrarian transformations. This was a result of the defeat of the revolution there at the end of the '20s and of the further savage oppression and reaction, and of the fact that there were no underground Communist organisations in the villages and even in towns.

The Communist Party, the Government and the political staff of the Army had to exert tremendous efforts to raise the level of political awareness of the masses and begin land reform on a broad scale. The Central People's Government planned to complete land reform in 1952 in areas populated by Chinese (Han). In Kwangtung and Kuanghsi provinces, land reform only began in 1952. For many South China villages land reform meant the beginning of the revolution. The revolutionizing effect of the war against Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang, which played a tremendous role in the mobilization of North China villages, was extremely weak in the South, where the revolutionary forces seldom entered the villages and fought their way along the highways to the towns, making some 15 kilometres a day. In the North the Kuomintang forces concentrated in towns away from the revolutionary villages, but in the South they left the towns for the feudal village under pressure of the revolutionary forces from the North.

The liberation of the rural areas in South China from counter-revolutionaries greatly stimulated the peasants' revolutionary consciousness. Many

¹ *Nanfang jihpao*, March 10, 1951.

² Ku Ta-tsun, *Report of the People's Government of Kwangtung Province for the Past Ten Months*, Kwangchow, October 1951, p. 8.

peasants, oppressed by reactionaries and afraid of the future, were at first skeptical about the changes that were being carried out and did not believe in the stability of the new system. Influenced by counter-revolutionary propaganda they often regarded the People's Liberation Army fighters as unwelcome strangers.

V The peasantry did not play a prominent role in the liberation of the South. They did not even liberate themselves—the villages—to say nothing of the towns, whose leading role during the concluding stage of the revolutionary war was unquestionable.

The town's role would have been even greater had there been a well-organized industrial proletariat in Kwangchow, able to form a vanguard of Communists to work against feudal domination in the villages and promote their socio-economic transformation. But there was no such proletariat in Kwangchow or anywhere in South China. And what there was of the working class was scattered among tiny semi-feudal enterprises and needed to be liberated, organized and politically educated. In this sense the situation in southern Chinese towns was little different from that in the villages. The urban proletariat had been greatly affected by the fact that for years the Chinese Communist Party had been concentrating its work on rural areas, away from proletarian centres. Thus, even after the liberation of the towns in South China including Kwangchow, the revolutionary centre of the '20s, considerable efforts were required to mobilize the working masses for the Party's revolutionary work.

When the towns were liberated much was done to unite the workers through trade unions, to rally them and educate them politically. But the effect of the great moral and material oppression of the past and the penetration of hostile elements into the trade unions hampered establishment of the Party's authority among the working class through trade unions. Therefore trade union work was carried out alongside the campaign against reactionary elements at industrial enterprises. That campaign was called the "movement for democratic transformations at enterprises." It developed wherever working masses were concentrated—at ports, plants and factories, workers' collective associations and in workers' quarters. It was especially intensive on southern waterways—the main means of communication in the southern provinces.

Thus the Chinese Communist Party had actually to correct its erroneous policy of belittling the working-class role in the revolutionary struggle and the development of the new state. This took considerable time.

It is noteworthy that on August 1, 1951, two years after the liberation of South China, the Central-Southern Bureau of the Central Committee had to pass a special resolution on mobilizing the working masses for the campaign for democratic transformations.¹ A conference of secretaries of the Communist Party city committees from twelve big southern Chinese cities was held in Kwangchow to discuss concrete measures for promoting the movement. On September 1 the movement got under way at only 26 fairly big state

and private enterprises in Kwangchow. It was directed by the city trade union council headed by the city Party committee and the city people's government.

The situation in southern Chinese villages after liberation clearly refutes Mao Tse-tung's idea of the exclusive role of the peasantry in the revolution. One may recall the implementation of land reform in the South. Terrorised by landowners and unorganised, the peasants there did not hurry to join the revolution.

To carry out land reform the Communist Party had to organize a new peasant movement, which took two or three years after the victory of the revolution and the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic. It goes without saying that the need for agitation for the reform was not due to the peasants' lack of interest in it, as asserted by counter-revolutionaries. Rather it was due to the fact that the southern peasants had not been prepared for the way the reform was to be carried out, counting on the peasants' voluntary and resolute struggle against the surviving feudal forces. The influence of landowners and their henchmen was still strong in the villages.

In 1951-52 southern Chinese newspapers carried a number of resolutions by the Central-Southern Bureau and the Southern Bureau of the Party Central Committee which reflected the difficulties encountered in land reform, the low level of activity on the part of the peasants and insufficient efforts on the part of local Party organisations. The Wuhan newspaper *Chang Kiang jihpao* said on November 30, 1951 that land reform in Kuanghsi Province proceeded satisfactorily in only one-sixth of all the villages.

¹ *Chang Kiang jihpao*, August 8, 1951.

Thus the revolutionary balance of the town and village in South China immediately before, during and after the liberation completely disproves Mao's concept. The southern village was not merely oppressed; it was more reactionary on the whole than the northern village. The southern town still lacked the force capable of mobilizing the masses. There is only one reason for this. For many years Party work had been neglected not only in the village, which was under feudal rule, but also in towns where the Party could function only illegally. Herein lies the mistake of the Maoist policy which relied solely on the peasantry and only the peasantry in those regions which the Communist Party could control with the help of the People's Army.

This is why a military march from the North was necessary to liberate South China and carry out social transformations there. The People's Liberation Army became the main revolutionary force and support of the new system. It must be pointed out that in its work of destroying the counter-revolutionary forces and winning over the masses the army actually played the role of the working class. It carried out the functions of the working class and established its hegemony in the process of liberation, which began in the towns and spread to the villages and not vice versa.

Perhaps the Maoists regard liberation through military means as a typical example of the "people's war" in regions where counter-revolutionary forces prevail both in towns and in the villages? But then there could be no ground for the theory of "encirclement of the bad town by the good village." What is even worse, is that revolution

by means of military marches is canonized. Thus if the Chinese experience were to be held up as an example for others, the next step would be the adoption of the anti-Leninist thesis of the export of revolution "through war".

In their attempt to prove the correctness of the "people's war theory," the Maoists like to quote the following well-known statement by Mao Tse-tung: "The seizure of power by means of arms is the central task and the highest form of revolution, i.e. the solution of the problem through war. This revolutionary principle of Marxism-Leninism is universally true; it is undoubtedly true for China as it is for the other states." That this is contrary to Marxism-Leninism and the experience of the international communist movement is obvious.

It is equally obvious why the Maoists are so persistent in their search for Chinese-type revolutionary conditions in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Their intention is undoubtedly one of winning leadership over these countries and even accelerating the revolutionary process by means of arms.

The important point, however, is that not all members of the Chinese Communist Party support Mao's "people's war theory" and his proposition that all social problems should be solved by war, or his conception of the revolutionary balance of forces between the village and the town in China.

VI For Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues, the propaganda of the war of the "world village" against the "world town" is an ideological instrument in the struggle for China's great-power hegemony. The Peking press keeps talking about the "special mission" of China, which means in practice the aggravation of the international situation and the fanning of political crises and conflicts that might lead to war. To fulfil this mission the Maoists do not even shrink from the idea of a new global war in which half the humanity would perish including millions of Chinese. If half of humanity is destroyed, Mao reasons, the other half will survive, while imperialism will be completely wiped out and socialism alone will reign in the world; and in some fifty years or a century human population will increase and become even larger than it is now. Even Hitler did not reach this far in his delirium.

In their great-power dreams the modern Chinese leadership ignore the class approach in assessing the situation in various countries and the relations of China with these countries. They pay no attention to the demand of our time—that of uniting all the forces of socialism and progress in the struggle against war and imperialist reaction, on the contrary they exert great efforts to split the socialist community, isolate the interna-

tional working class from the national-liberation movement and set nations against one another.

Theoretically Mao's military revolutionary strategy which relies solely on the village is an anti-scientific denial of the ability of the working class to lead the peasant masses. This view was typical of earlier anti-Marxists and opportunists, including Trotsky. The strategy of "encirclement of big towns" amounts to renouncing the historical goals and the class character of the contemporary revolutionary struggle. According to the Maoists the revolutionary forces striving for socialism do not exist in the "world town," but only in the "world village."

The apologists for the "people's war theory" have abandoned the scientific Marxist-Leninist approach in analysing the present-day class struggle and the correlation of the motive forces of the socialist revolution on a world scale, and have adopted instead a military-geographical scheme. According to this scheme, policy as a form of class struggle is of no significance, consequently, the liberation wars that are an outcome of the policy become isolated from it and are reduced to a military-technical problem. The directions of military marches are mapped beforehand; the tactics is based on the assumption that the hundreds of millions of people living in the "poor" countries are preoccupied with the sole problem of a global war against the "rich" countries.

Marxism-Leninism does not reject armed struggle as a means of overthrowing imperialism and reaction and of achieving national liberation. The socialist countries and the Communist Parties of the world actively help the peoples fighting for liberation. Nevertheless, armed struggle and par-

ticularly peasant wars are not the absolute condition for attaining revolutionary victory today, for the forces of socialism have become the decisive factor in world development. Many former colonial and semi-colonial peoples have won independence without military actions. They are now faced with the huge historic tasks of peaceful construction—the creation of a firm basis for national independence. The policy of peaceful coexistence which is being carried out by the socialist countries and supported by international progressive quarters paralyzes the reactionary and aggressive imperialist forces and mobilizes the masses for active resistance to fascism and war. It thus creates favourable conditions for the development of the revolutionary process.

It is not always that the progressive classes resort to war, but only when it is necessary to defend their interests by means of military actions. Lenin believed war to be justified only when the interests of workers and peasants and the cause of socialism and democracy could not be defended against imperialism in any other way.

Marxists do not believe that capitalism is to be liquidated through a world war. Such a war represents a threat to all humanity. Nuclear strikes at the enemy would above all destroy millions of working people. The very revolutionary force would suffer most. To hope for a world war as the major condition for revolutionary victory is to believe that capitalism will fall, not under the revolutionary struggle of the classes inside the capitalist society, but under attacks launched from outside.

The Communist Parties consider it their duty to lead the working people to revolution and vic-

tory over the world imperialist forces in conditions of peace, without a nuclear war.

But if the international imperialist reaction insists on involving humanity in such a war, it will be defeated, however great the sacrifice, and the capitalist system will perish.

Peking's ideas of a global and regional "people's war" bear no relation to reality. During the 18 years of the existence of People's China, a number of revolutionary and people's liberation wars has been fought in South-East Asia, Latin America and Africa. Victories were won in different ways. But whenever the Chinese leaders tried to force their policy on the left-wing forces in some of the countries of these continents, these forces were invariably defeated. Many peoples in Asia and Africa are still faced with the grim results of Chinese interference in their domestic affairs.

The Maoists try to depict the process of national liberation developing in Africa as the central force in modern world development, and completely ignore the international working class and the world system of socialism. Their intention is to use this process as proof of their "people's war theory." They find a degree of support only where the working class is extremely weak or where the Communist and Workers' Parties are not yet sufficiently influential. They try to arouse in the young African states distrust of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries as well as of the revolutionary working-class movement in West Europe and the US. Mao's hope is to win over as many Africans as possible to his policies.

The Peking politicians completely ignore the social and political problems facing the newly-liberated countries in Africa and push them onto

the path of military conflicts and coups. This distracts the young nations from the major task of the modern anti-colonial struggle—to achieve economic independence—and weakens their positions in the struggle against imperialism.

Peking's hope is to rally the entire African continent round the banner of Mao Tse-tung. The basis for Peking diplomacy is the attitude to the person of Mao and his "thoughts" shown by the statesmen and ordinary people of Africa. This is also the basis on which the Chinese government establishes its relations with other countries. Under the camouflage of solidarity with and assistance to young nations the Chinese and pro-Chinese extremists are engaged in dangerous subversive activities. Peking would support any forces irrespective of their ideology, if these forces are ready to involve Africa in a terrorist "people's war."

Hoping to secure Chinese leadership in the "people's war" and impose the Chinese experience on other countries, the Maoists are engaged in inciting armed guerrilla movements which rely on the sole support of the villages. Several new African states have been compelled to break diplomatic relations with the Chinese People's Republic and expel Chinese representatives. It is obvious that the experience of the Chinese guerrilla war is hardly applicable to other countries, particularly if they are small countries. If one is to believe Mao's "theory," the "people's war" of the village encircling the towns must be infinitely long and burdensome, involving great sacrifices of human lives and enormous expenditures and bringing no significant military or political results. If put into practice in the concrete condi-

tions of the national-liberation struggle in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the Chinese strategy and tactics will not promote the consolidation and growth of the revolutionary forces. On the contrary, they can be easily used by the feudal and reactionary forces in these countries as well as by former colonialists and imperialists armed with neo-colonialist slogans to their own advantage.

The Marxist-Leninist theory is not opposed to guerrilla warfare, but it does not regard it as an absolute necessity, the only form of struggle by the working people against their enemy. This is proved by history. During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, the partisan movement developed on a wide scale, but it was the regular army that dealt the decisive blow at the German forces. In South Vietnam today the hardest blows at the enemy are dealt by the Liberation Army. In Angola the progressive forces make up the regular rebel units. This is to be expected, since only regular troops can really defeat the enemy. The major successes in the Chinese revolution were also achieved by the organized army and not by the scattered guerrilla-fighters.

At the same time, Marxist-Leninists support guerrilla movements, which constitute a great help to the general armed struggle against imperialism, but only when they are able to undertake organized actions on a broad scale.

During the Second World War many countries of Europe and Asia acquired real and extensive experience in conducting people's warfare, including guerrilla war. The struggle against German fascism, especially in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the strug-

gle against Japanese imperialism in China, Indochina, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and Thailand were too manifold to be labelled "people's war" as understood by the Maoists. The experience of these struggles should be studied, and if applied it should be modified in accordance with the concrete historical situation and the state of revolutionary development of each individual country. It is a dangerous and provocative move on the part of the Mao group to proclaim that the Chinese experience of the people's war is universal and that the specific features of the revolutionary struggle in China constitute a general law.

Sinister symptoms of the "people's war" have appeared in China's neighbouring countries these last few years. State borders are no longer an obstacle to the penetration by the Chinese and specially trained guerrilla fighters of other nationalities into Indochina, Thailand and Burma.

The Maoists' activities have deeply affected Burma's national interests, infringing upon its state sovereignty. A whole region has been set aside in Yunnan Province, which borders on Burma, where Burmese and Chinese extremists are trained for guerrilla warfare. On July 1, 1967 Radio Peking broadcast an "Appeal to All Burmese" in which pro-Chinese Burmese extremists called for a "people's war" against the Ne Win Government (with which, by the way, China has signed an official treaty of friendship).

Guerrilla operations with bases in Yunnan began in October 1967 and spread to a number of regions in northern Burma. Detachments of 50 to 200 Chinese penetrated into Burma for dozens of miles. Simultaneously attempts were made to stir up an uprising among the peasantry and set

up so-called liberated areas. Failing in this plan, the guerrillas gradually turned into regular saboteurs. At present they are engaged in destroying railway stations, bridges, depots, and passenger trains, burning down rice-driers, tractor stations and shops.

Peking agents are carrying out subversive activities among the Naga tribesmen in the region on both sides of the Indo-Burmese border. Their aim is to stir up an uprising of the national minorities that would spread to India. Despite the Sino-Burmese border agreement the Peking leadership has raised a new territorial question with Burma and has even raised questions concerning the Burmese-Indian border.

Peking's long-range policy regarding Burma has the aim of splitting the Union of Burma by the armed pro-Chinese nationalist forces into three states: Burma proper and the states of Shan and Kachin. The policy is in line with the great-power nationalist objective of the Maoists—the disintegration of all states into weak national state formations, with the 700-million-strong China united and assured of world hegemony.

The Maoists interfere in the affairs of other neighbouring countries as well by extolling the "brilliant example" of the application of Mao Tse-tung's "people's war theory" which presumably would enable the people of any country to "overcome their enemy, however strong."

In their nationalist delirium the Maoists are doing their best to undermine the unity of the socialist countries and the Communist Parties that are assisting Vietnam and to make a political settlement of the war in Vietnam impossible.

The Vietnamese struggle against US aggression

has clearly shown that it has nothing to do with the Maoist scheme which opposes the village to the town. During the January 1968 offensive the South Vietnamese National Liberation Forces made towns the advanced posts of the liberation struggle, an important scene of military actions. The Vietnam experience completely refutes the strategy and tactics of the "people's war" of the village against the town. It actually reveals Peking's position of capitulation before US imperialism. The Peking leadership openly guarantees the aggressor that China will not directly take part in the war. Indifferent to the terrible lot of the Vietnamese people, the Maoist group undertakes various activities for undermining the joint assistance rendered to Vietnam by the socialist countries and other progressive forces.

At the end of August 1967, Mao Tse-tung told an Albanian military delegation: "There are also people who say that China loves peace. I think this is too strong an expression. To my mind the Chinese people are still a bellicose people." (*The Hsinyetsin*, September 28, 1967). Seizing upon this slander about the Chinese people the Red Guard newspapers hailed the "great proletarian cultural revolution" in China as the "ideological preparation of cadres for victory in the third world war" (*Hungweiping chike, Sangkiang pinglun*, November 1967).

In their attempt to spread their bellicose idea of the "people's war" to the rest of the world, the Maoists also make the experience of China's military development into a general concept. Yet it is a fact that what is going on in the Chinese People's Republic and its army has nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist principles concerning

the education of the masses and the use of the socialist state's armed forces in the struggle for freedom and democracy.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army, born in the flames of revolutionary struggle and respected by the working people, has now been made a blind instrument of the nationalist chauvinistic policy of Mao Tse-tung and his yes-men. Today it is an instrument with which the leadership threatens the socialist gains in China.

The Maoists' anti-Leninist views on the role of the army became especially pronounced in the course of the notorious "cultural revolution." When the organizations of the hungweipings (Red Guards) and tsaofans (Red Rebels) had discredited themselves by every kind of atrocity and hooliganism, causing wide-spread resentment among the population and particularly the working class, and had proved unable to smash the forces of opposition and resistance Mao Tse-tung resolved to use the People's Liberation Army.

On January 28, 1967 the army was ordered to take part in the campaign against Mao's political opponents. It was given the chief role in the "cultural revolution." It began to exercise political and economic control in towns and villages, to act in place of the legislative and executive government bodies and all the state, economic and other organisations. The army was used to liquidate the entire leading Communist Party apparatus and the mass organizations of the Komsomol and to dissolve the trade unions. The army took part in the so-called seizure of power in towns and provinces; it was an instrument of mass terror, persecution and reprisals against the opponents of Mao, an instrument of armed suppres-

sion against the popular masses opposed to Mao's policy and struggling to preserve the socialist gains in China.

The unprecedented case where the army was used against the people is presented by Peking propaganda organs as a "great feat accomplished in the name of socialism" and a continuation of the traditions of the "people's war." But it is noteworthy that many garrisons and even whole army units refused to fight against the people. Moreover, in some places, in the industrial city of Wuhan, for example, they went over to the workers' side and fought in defence of the local Party and government bodies.

The working class has become a prominent force opposing the "cultural revolution," which it regards as a destructive and reactionary movement. The Chinese workers showed a genuinely revolutionary spirit and a high level of organization as they defended the Party committees from the hungweipings and tsaofans in many provincial centres and industrial cities. Their action vividly demonstrated the progressive role of the working class in the struggle for power and socialism. The Maoists' clashes with the working class prove that the Mao leadership consists of a mere handful of petty-bourgeois adventurers with no truly revolutionary principles and understanding. They have always underestimated the role of the working class and advanced a petty-bourgeois peasant ideology which is little different from anarchism.

A legitimate question arises: where is the Chinese village where four fifths of the country's population is to be found? The fact is that the peasants are plainly dissatisfied with the "cultural revolution." They have even shown an inclina-

tion to go to the towns and help the workers fight against the Maoist extremists. The Mao group has failed to secure the peasantry's support. This is the only explanation for the fact that the Mao men have hesitated in launching the "cultural revolution" on a broad scale in the villages.

The relationship between the town and the village in China today is a piece of damning evidence against the "people's war theory." Anti-Marxist ideas and counter-revolutionary experiments regarding the working class and the peasantry have proved a failure.

There are two important points which reveal the essence of the "cultural revolution" and characterize the Maoist adventurous policy. Firstly, Mao described the "revolution" as "great proletarian," and then his supporters suddenly began to speak about the dictatorship of the proletariat. Secondly, the Maoists bar peasant participation in this "revolution." Mao's ideological warriors—his wife Chiang Ching, Chen Po-ta and others—have sharply criticized the peasant marches to the towns.

The idea of the dependence of the revolution on the peasantry was popular among the Maoists after the victory of the Chinese revolution as well. It is not accidental that Mao has avoided the question of the development of the people's democratic revolution into the socialist revolution in his theoretical writings. Such is the petty-bourgeois background of the peasant ideology of the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung." The goals of the socialist revolution were lost in Mao's nationalistic and great-power ventures.

Ten years after the victory of the Chinese revolution and the formation of the Chinese People's

Republic, the Maoists who had by then built up the country's strength with the help of the Soviet Union began to assert that the revolution was won on the strength of Mao Tse-tung's theory of peasant war. In listening to them one would think that modern Chinese history had never come under the crucial influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the impact of the working-class revolutionary movement in the '20's in China itself, the guidance of the Comintern, or the influence of the great historic victory scored by the Soviet Union against German fascism and Japanese imperialism.

The people surrounding Mao Tse-tung hail him as "leader, teacher, helmsman and commander" of the world peasant revolution and of the war of the "world village" against the "world town." Why is it then that the Maoists are now suddenly talking about the proletarian cultural revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat?

The answer is to be found in the negative attitude of the Chinese socialist village towards the harmful domestic policy of Mao Tse-tung.

The Chinese peasantry played a truly tremendous role under the leadership of the Communist Party in routing the Kuomintang, but they have never come out against the progressive forces in the towns, least of all, against the working class. They equally benefited from the victory of the revolution. The land reform and the subsequent establishment of cooperative farming opened real prospects for a socialist transformation of the village. The alliance of the working class and the peasantry formed a reliable support for the Communist Party and the People's Government as

long as the latter carried out a genuine policy of socialist development.

This fact was noted in the resolutions of the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in September 1956. Less than two years later the Mao group launched its policy of "three red banners" (Sixth Plenum, CPC CC, November-December, 1958): "the general line" (build fast, well, much and economically); the "great leap forward" in industry; and people's (village) communes. While the whole scheme was wild, the voluntarist experiment of the "village communes" was downright suicidal.

Mao's new policy led to the disruption of socialist development in the village, poverty and hunger for the peasantry. The Maoists' political adventurism became even more pronounced after the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee (August 1959) when a number of resolutions was adopted actually calling off the "three red banners" policy, the "great leap forward" in industry and the "village communes" in agriculture. One of the resolutions announced the policy of "regulation, consolidation, enhancement and replenishment." The "village communes" ceased to exist, although the name was preserved as proof of the infallibility of "Mao Tse-tung's thoughts". To save agriculture from complete ruin, the peasants were again allowed to keep individual plots of land, sell produce on the market and engage in village handicrafts. Each peasant, however, had to supply the state with a fixed amount of deliveries.

The peasants' distrust of the Maoist town became obvious following Mao's policy which held that "agriculture is the basis of the development of the national economy." That policy meant not

only the renunciation of industrialization but also the total mobilization of the village resources for maintaining the huge bureaucratic apparatus and the army, as well as for the export of foodstuffs and raw materials. Another policy—"reliance on one's own strength"—deprived the village of assistance from the town and of the necessary reinforcement of the village productive forces. The plans for the mechanization of agriculture and the steady improvement of farming methods remain unfulfilled. The Chinese village is doomed to backwardness, ignorance and painfully slow development based on primitive manual labour.

The policy of the "great leap forward" and the "village communes" reveals Mao Tse-tung's petty-bourgeois and utopian peasant outlook. One of the latest "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" expressed in the ultra-revolutionary slogan "policy is the commanding force"—envisages that China, a country with a backward and mixed economy, will be able to go over directly to communism bypassing the phase of socialism.

Today when the grim economic consequences of the "great leap" have not yet been eliminated, the Mao group are working hard on the implementation of the "people's war" policy—expansionism, support for the world anti-communist and anti-Soviet forces and bribery of influential nationalist quarters in the emergent countries. This costly policy is being paid for through the practice of stringent economy inside China, chiefly at the expense of the peasantry. The peasants have been deprived even of the small advantages they used to have when they were paid for by work-days in the peasant cooperatives.

They are now obliged to make huge deliveries to the state and pay high taxes.

To appease the dissatisfied village masses Mao is now fanning the "contradictions among the people." He has restored the class differentiation of the peasants which existed some twenty years ago before land reform and the organization of peasant cooperatives were carried out. But Mao Tse-tung has failed in setting the former poor and middle peasants against the other half of the disgruntled village. The economic effect of this policy is nil, for the peasants have been placed in such conditions that the best they can do is to make both ends meet. The harvest hardly provides for village consumption, and the towns subsist on the scanty deliveries from villages and to some extent on imported grain.

It is no wonder therefore that the Chinese village has ceased to be "good" and to support the Maoists in encircling the rebellious town. This is why Mao and his colleagues have been extremely cautious in spreading their "cultural revolution" to the unreliable village. Even the Peking propaganda-makers are unable to conceal the fact that the peasants are opposing the "cultural revolution."

Alarmed by the appearance of peasant detachments armed with spears and long knives, the Maoists have taken special measures to isolate the towns from the villages by setting up military cordons at railways, highways and riverways. Addressing a meeting of "red rebels" Chen Po-ta spoke with obvious anxiety about peasant marches on the towns. "When this develops on a mass scale," he said, "it will become a rather serious matter."

Losing their support in the village, the Maoists now pose as fighters for the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the beginning, the suppression of the opponents of the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" was hailed as the "great proletarian cultural revolution" of student youth—the hungweipings. But when the "cultural revolution" encountered resistance from the working class and staunch Communists, new forms of attack on the "headquarters" of local Party organisations and workers' staffs were devised. They were carried out first by the tsao-fans and then by the army in the "seizure of power" campaign. Finally, the Maoists had to resort to new means of obtaining power. They began setting up so-called revolutionary committees throughout the country. These revolutionary committees were claimed to represent the major socio-political forces of modern China—the "revolutionary masses" of the towns, the army and the Party cadres. The committees, however, had no room for the peasantry—the largest section of Chinese society—to say nothing of the working class.

But the forces which resist and oppose the "cultural revolution" are not defeated. Today they are fighting, together with Communists who are true to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, the Maoists' counter-revolutionary policy, in defence of socialist gains. This is the logical outcome of the "people's war theory." It is not the peasantry but the regular armed forces and storm-troopers of the hungweipings and tsao-fans that the Maoists regard as the "decisive force of the world revolutionary process." It is they that have been entrusted to "spread the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung throughout the planet."

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One may thus conclude that the town-and-village relationship in China could not be made to fit the pseudo-scientific scheme of the village encircling the town. The peasantry as a class has never assumed the role of hegemon in the revolution. It has never opposed the progressive forces of the town headed by the working class but is allied with it.

The "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" to the effect that the path of the revolution leads from the "village to the town" and that modern history consists in the "revolutionary onslaught of the village against the town on a world scale" have nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism. Karl Marx wrote that the peasants found their natural ally and leader in the urban proletariat which was destined to overthrow the bourgeois system. Lenin expressed the same idea even more plainly. He said that the town inevitably led the village and the village inevitably followed the town.

The "cultural revolution" is spearheaded against the Communist Party and the socialist system. The Maoists also call it the "people's war" aimed at defending the "dictatorship of the proletariat," which in fact means the establishment of Mao Tse-tung's absolute rule. Meanwhile by imposing Mao's petty-bourgeois peasant ideology on the country and carrying out an adventurist policy devised by the Maoist group, the Maoists have brought China to the brink of another civil war.

Contemporary international development is marked by the successes of the world socialist system, the growth of the international working-

class movement and the liberation of former colonies and dependent countries. The major tasks facing the so-called poor countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are: complete liberation from imperialist powers, struggle for national independence by peoples who are still under colonialism and struggle to overcome economic, technical and cultural backwardness.

To solve the urgent domestic problems in countries with a large population, there must be cooperation between the towns and the villages and not war. A healthy relationship between the village and the town can be developed through the close alliance of the working class and the peasantry in the name of revolutionary transformation, democracy and socialism.

The major task of the Communists in economically backward, formerly oppressed countries with a predominantly peasant population is to educate the working masses according to the working-class revolutionary ideology and to work for unity with the international communist and working-class movement. Today such unity is achieved mainly through economic, political and ideological cooperation with the socialist countries.

The unity of the international communist and working-class movement, the unity of all the revolutionary forces, is a prerequisite for the mobilization of the masses of both the towns and the villages on all continents for the struggle against imperialism, for the victory of the cause of peace and the security of nations, for the triumph of democracy, national liberation and socialism.

The "people's war theory" and the activities of the Mao group are directed against the revolutionary process. They cannot serve as a basis for

solving the national and social problems of modern society. The anti-scientific "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" and the "people's war theory" contradict the objective laws of social development. They are refuted by the very course of events in Asia, Africa and Latin America and are rejected by the peoples of these continents. The Maoists' sinister attempts to implement them by force and by interference in the home affairs of many countries only cause the relations between these countries and the Chinese People's Republic to deteriorate and lead to the latter's isolation on the world scene.

The Soviet people and the Communist Party vigorously condemn the subversive nationalist and great-power policy pursued by Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues. But no one in the Soviet Union identifies the Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party with the Mao clique. There is no question that China will remain a socialist country, that it will survive the crisis created by the Maoist policies and continue to advance towards the complete triumph of socialism and communism alongside the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

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